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MANITOBA CORN GROWERS ASSOCIATION INC. vs
U.S. CORN EXPORTS  (An Application of Regional
Market Rules under Canadian Trade Remedy Law)
R.M.A. Loyns1
INTRODUCTION
Prairie corn production is, by almost all standards, a small crop.
Manitoba production represents most of the corn produced on the Cana-
dian Prairies so its production is also small. But it is not a “small” crop for
the three or four hundred producers who grow it, and it is a relatively high
input and risky crop. These growers, like most other Canadian crop pro-
ducers, are aware of the high level of public support available to crop
producers across the border in the United States. They are also aware that
their ability to obtain favourable returns from the marketplace is reduced
by that public support. Along with a fledgling soybean effort in a few
areas, U.S. production and imports dominate the corn market more than
any other commodity on the Canadian Prairies. As a consequence, this
small group of Manitoba corn producers attempted to seek relief from the
unbalanced trading environment by an application to Canadian trade rem-
edy law as expressed in the Special Imports Measures Act. In August 2000,
____________________
1  The author researched and wrote this paper and is responsible alone for contents and
accuracy of the paper.  I am indebted to several colleagues for helpful review comments
at various stages of writing, and for suggestions from both U.S. and Canadian officials
with expertise on their respective trade laws.317
the Manitoba Corn Growers Association (MCGA) filed anti-dumping and
countervailing duty actions against imports of grain corn from the United
States. Because of the geographic area covered by the action, this case was
subject to regional, as opposed to the more frequently used national, rules
of inquiry, findings and injury.
In its preliminary investigation reported in October 2000, Canada
Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) upheld the claims of dumping and
subsidization and proceeded to determining the initial assessment of in-
jury. On November 7, 2000, large dumping and countervailing duties were
applied which effectively cut off all corn imports from the United States
into the Prairies. This development caused major disruptions in the live-
stock/feed sectors of southern Manitoba, and many groups became in-
volved in lobbying the investigation process to have the duties removed.
There was very little visible intervention in this process from the United
States. On March 7, 2001, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT)
reported a finding of non-injury “to all or almost all producers” in the
prairie region and, according to the rules, terminated the action and the
duties. This finding occurred in the presence of a large, combined dump-
ing and subsidization margin, despite the finding of significant price re-
ductions for many producers, and despite evidence of a direct and close
relationship between U.S. corn prices and prairie corn prices. The finding
of no-injury was entirely the result of the “regional rules” under which the
case was administered.
This purpose of this paper is to describe the nature and the process
of this regional application of Canadian trade remedy law. Background
information is intentionally limited because ordinary market relationships
had little to do with the outcome of the case. For this workshop, what is
important is the action that was filed, the findings and reasons given by
Canadian regulators, and an economic assessment of those factors in rela-
tion to two factors:
• the contribution of this trade remedy action to removing policy
and trade stress; and
• how these factors relate to the use of NAFTA as a vehicle for
promoting free trade and harmonious trade relations.
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Contrary to comments made by the discussant from the National Corn
Growers Association (discussion following), the author of this paper is
much more interested in implications of this case for dispute resolution
and trade harmony within NAFTA  than in the actual outcome. This objec-
tive fits the intent of presenting four case studies at the workshop.
THE PRAIRIE CORN MARKET
Grain corn production on the Canadian Prairies is a relatively new
crop and it is highly concentrated in southern Manitoba. Its history really
began in the late 1970s when lower degree-day varieties became avail-
able, weather conditions seemed more favourable, and producers were
shopping for alternatives to congested conventional crop markets. Acre-
age reached 225,000 acres in 1981 but high interest rates, weather prob-
lems and production limitations reduced acreage to early 1970 levels in
the 1980s. Production increased again after 1996 when there were 45,000
acres in Manitoba and by 2000 there were 110,000 acres. Production in
2000 and 2001 was about 10 million bushels. By contrast, Quebec and
Ontario produce up to 350 million bushels which represents 96 percent of
Canadian production. Barley, historically the main feed grain, is grown on
over 1 million acres in Manitoba and around 10 million acres on the Prai-
ries. (Table 1 and Appendix Table A.1).
The major use of grain corn on the Prairies, both domestic and
imported, is livestock feed. A small amount is used in distilling, ethanol
production and other minor uses. As a result, grain corn competes with
Table 1: Canadian Grain Production, by Region
Production 1990/1991 1999/2000 2000/2001*
Total E. Canada 271 million bu. 350 million bu. 257 million bu.
Manitoba 6.5 9.4 10.4
Total W. Canada 7.1 10.2 11.5
United States > 30 x Canada  > 30 x Canada > 30 x Canada
Note: * indicates estimates.
Sources: CITT Research Branch Paper dated 1.2.01 and Canada Grains
Council, Statistical Handbook 2001.319
domestically produced wheat and barley, and it co-exists with soybean
and canola meal as protein sources, in feed mixes. The livestock feed mar-
ket in Manitoba has been growing very rapidly since the mid-1990s be-
cause of the growth of livestock feeding in the area, mainly hogs. For
example, from 1994 to 2000 hog slaughter in Manitoba doubled and when
weanling and finished pig exports are included, the data indicate that total
Manitoba hog production has almost tripled in ten years.
This livestock/feed expansion occurred during a period when two
major events influencing the feed grain market unfolded. The first is de-
regulation. In 1995 the Government of Canada removed a long-standing
U.S. irritant in the grain industry by terminating almost all of the freight
subsidy programs that existed for grains exported from the Prairies. The
impact was to significantly lower grain prices within the Prairies and to
increase  the motivation to feed livestock. In Manitoba, prices were influ-
enced the most and incentives were strongest to diversify to hogs. But
higher transportation costs also caused crop producers to grow higher val-
ued crops (canola, peas, beans, lentils, soybeans, forage seed, corn and
potatoes) with the result that wheat production is falling and barley pro-
duction is not increasing despite increased demand for feed.
The second major event is the incidence of fusarium head blight
(FHB). In most of southern Manitoba, FHB has progressed to the point
where it is severely limiting the ability to produce wheat and barley, effec-
tively cutting off local supplies of hog-quality feed wheat and barley. Corn,
despite its other production risks in northern conditions, is the only feed
grain that has reasonable FHB resistance in the infected area. The alterna-
tives are to import barley and wheat from non-infected areas to the west
and north, or to import U.S. corn. Both of these feed sources have in-
creased in Manitoba over the past five years.
When these factors are combined, they mean that the intensive
livestock area of Manitoba has become an import-based market for feed
grain that meets the quality requirements of hog feed. The import basis, by
itself, provides a transportation advantage to local producers who have
hog-quality feed stocks; corn producers and a few “lucky” wheat and bar-
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ley producers are the only ones in the area who can supply that quality.
Corn (and soybean) imports from the United States, as well as the subsidy
impacts of U.S. programs on wheat and barley in international markets,
reduce overall price levels, limit profitability of crop production and, along
with FHB, reduce the incentive to produce corn and all feed grains in the
area.
 On top of this, the United States has feed prices which are held
down by crop subsidies. The impact of these factors has been to switch the
competitive advantage in livestock feeding from the prairies and the
Manitoba corn area, to the producers south of the border. In market termi-
nology, there has been a “basis switch” between southern Manitoba and
the northern states sometime after 1996. What began as an advantage to
the eastern prairies in feeding livestock (when the transportation subsidies
were removed) has shifted south as U.S. crop subsidization has increased.
This proposition is confirmed by feed mill buyers and by the fact that
Manitoba exports of weanling pigs has increased from 260,000 in 1994 to
over 1.5 million in 2001 (Table 2).2 This situation has evolved despite the
significant fall in on-farm prices resulting from termination of the export
freight subsidies on the Prairies.
Imports of U.S. corn into western Canada have exceeded produc-
tion in the area every year since 1990-‘91 except 1991-‘92, sometimes by
a factor of two or three (Table 3). Over the period 1990–2000, at least half
of the imports were into Manitoba. Imports from the United States into
eastern Canada (distributed between Ontario and Quebec) are about double
those into western Canada, but they represent a much smaller proportion
of production (on average about 10 percent).
____________________
2  Data released by Manitoba Agriculture since this paper was presented indicate that
weanling exports in 2002 will show a further increase.
Table 2: Manitoba Hog and Weanling Exports (million live hogs)
Category 1994 1995 1998 1999 2000 to Nov. 2001
< 50 kg 0.26 m 0.41 m 0.85 m 1.35 m 1.44 m 1.56 m
> 50 kg  0.17 m 0.32 m 0.81 m 0.93 m 0.90 m 0.81 m
Source: Janet Honey, Policy and Program Branch, Manitoba Agriculture.321
One other market characteristic that is relevant is the relationship
between U.S. and Manitoba corn prices. There are no barriers to importing
U.S. corn, there is a virtual infinite supply of corn (relative to demand)
within easy trucking distance, and there is a constant supply of grain trucks
prepared to load soybean meal and corn at “backhaul rates” from any-
where along the route between Minneapolis and Winnipeg. Usually, not
much more organization is required to get immediate delivery of U.S. corn
than having the right cell phone numbers. If one ignores the existence of
significant direct public support to U.S. corn growers, this highly inte-
grated, well-arbitraged little market could be said to perform very well in
economic terms.
Casual analysis and an unpublished AAFC paper conducted for
the CITT indicate that Manitoba cash corn prices track very closely those
in Minneapolis, both in level and in direction of change. Unusually large
supplies of feed quality barley and wheat on the eastern prairies may drive
a wedge between Minneapolis and Manitoba corn prices because these
markets do not arbitrage as closely as corn, but generally there is a close
relationship in corn prices. Domestic feed wheat, barley and corn prices
on the eastern prairies cannot move much above corn equivalent prices
without attracting more U.S. corn imports.
This brief description of the prairie corn market illustrates the mar-
ket environment into which the MCGA imposed their anti-dumping and
countervail action in August 2000. This action ultimately led to imports
being terminated on November 7, 2000 by the imposition of duties. Clearly
Manitoba corn growers are small players in the overall feed and livestock
market and  they are directly impacted by market conditions in the United
States. However, their market situation, and the conditions that brought
Table 3: Canadian Grain Corn Imports (Million Bushels) from the United States,
by Region.
Volume 1990-91 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1998-99 1999-2000
E. Canada 6.7 31.8 21.7 20.7 20.6 25.0
W. Canada 8.5 9.9 9.3 9.7 13.1 13.6
Manitoba 1.2 6.9 5.8 4.7 8.3 9.4
Source: CITT Research Publication dated 1.02.01.
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about their trade action, are symbolic of a much larger element of Cana-
dian agriculture. Corn imports into Ontario and Quebec certainly impact
on prices there. Indeed, in the final determination by CITT, it was reported
that subsidization margins were the same across Canada on imported corn.
Further, according to evidence and comments provided by Mexi-
can participants throughout our workshops, it is probable that the Manitoba
corn situation is also representative of the situation facing many Mexican
farmers. Consequently, this trade action and its outcome have economic
significance far beyond MCGA and the prairie corn market. There are
direct and immediate economic effects of subsidization in open markets
like this one whether the program is “domestic” as claimed by the U.S.
Corn Growers Association, or targeted in some other manner.
THE ACTION AND PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) has the responsi-
bility under the Special Imports Measures Act of conducting the prelimi-
nary investigation of unfair trading complaints and of making preliminary
findings related to the imposition of duties. CITT is responsible for the
final determination of amount of duties and determination of any “material
injury” to domestic producers. The CCRA investigation, other than geo-
graphic scope, was not altered by the fact that this trade remedy law action
was “regional.” The significance of regional rules is apparent in the sec-
ond level of investigation, conducted by CITT, when injury determination
is made. At that point, the “all or almost all” (producers) rule applies which
severely tightens the evidence on injury, making injury determination much
less likely than in an national action. CITT required that more than 90
percent of producers had to be materially injured to meet the regional test.
This section provides an overview of how these steps unfolded in the
Manitoba corn case.
The MCGA filed an action in August 2000, alleging injurious dump-
ing and subsidization on grain corn exported by the United States for use
in the geographic area west of the Manitoba/Ontario border. There were
minor exclusions for corn used as seed and for consumer products manu-323
facture but these exclusions are not important in either volume or impact
on the case. On November 7, 2000 CCRA announced the results of its
preliminary investigation and imposed anti-dumping and countervailing
duties on U.S. grain corn imported to the Prairies.
The Preliminary Dumping Investigation
 According to the rules, grain corn is dumped when it is sold to
importers in Canada at prices which are lower than prices in the United
States or when it is sold into Canada at unprofitable prices. The latter
application of this rule is the so-called “normal value rule.” In economic
terms these two versions are very different in substance and in testing. The
agricultural economic literature is full of theoretical and empirical evidence
that there is no compelling “normalcy” to the notion that prices should be
above  “cost of production” (COP) in any particular, short time period. Nor
is there a single “cost of production” for a large or even small group of
farmers. Instead there is an array of costs just as there is an array of market
prices at any point in time. Cost of production is an inappropriate measure
in agricultural dumping because farmers usually have little or no market
power. However, these are the rules and it is the “normal value “ version of
the rule that was applied in the corn case.3
The investigation determined that over the previous two years, 45
percent of the corn imports came from Minnesota, 34 percent came from
North Dakota and 10 percent from South Dakota. For determination of
normal value, USDA ERS data on COP were used, indicating that in 1998
the “normal value” was US$2.60/bu., and US$2.78/bu. in 1999.4 CCRA
claimed that in aggregate, grain corn had not generated commercial profit
in those states in four years. According to their definition, they reported
that nearly all corn had been dumped over the period of investigation. The
____________________
3  Throughout our workshops, participants have been critical of the use of cost of
production as “normal value.” In this case, corn prices were readily available on both
sides of the border, they could have been used, and likely they would have changed the
dumping finding. But regulators appear to avoid this approach. This example is one
among many of how arbitrary administrative rules might swing results.
4  At existing exchange rates and all other things held constant, these estimates imply
that the corn would be valued at about C$4.30 in southern Manitoba.
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average dumping margin was determined to be 36 percent which was equal
to US$1.01/bu. on the “normal” price of US$2.80/bu.
This stage of the investigation also found that the U.S. LDP and
MAL programs, Marketing  Loss  Assistance Payments, and federal Crop
Insurance programs constituted subsidization. The estimates were US$0.32/
bu. in 1998 and US$0.57/bu. in 1999 which represented 33 percent of the
weighted average export price. Applying the countervailing duty rules,
this magnitude of subsidization was found to be “significant.”  CCRA an-
nounced these findings on November 7, 2000 and anti-dumping duties
and countervailing duties were applied to all corn imported to the Prairies
equivalent to US$1.58/bu. Duties of this magnitude effectively shut down
imports of U.S. corn to the Prairies.
On February 5, 2001 the CCRA announced the results of their
final investigation, concluding that subsidy and dumping of U.S. corn “was
not insignificant” . . . but slightly reduced the combined margin of
US$1.30/bu. composed of US$0.63/bu. for subsidization and US$0.67 for
dumping. As a consequence of this finding, CITT initiated the next stage
of the inquiry under the regional case rules into injury or potential injury to
“all or almost all” producers on the Prairies.
FINAL DISPOSITION
The 2001 Annual Report (March 2001) of CITT summarizes the
major findings and the final decision and disposition of the Manitoba corn
case. CITT noted that the injury standard for a regional market is very
stringent. The evidence must demonstrate that the imported product in-
jured producers of “all or almost all” grain corn in western Canada. The
following excerpts are provided almost verbatim but are presented in rela-
tion to the purpose of the paper. Comments  follow each excerpt to reflect
the role of this paper in the workshop.
CITT found that dumped and subsidized corn imports from the
United States had caused prices of corn sold in western Canada to de-325
cline, causing financial injury to many domestic (corn) producers. This
conclusion in a final report of a trade law administrative agency is some-
what unusual; in national cases it is common at this stage to determine that
there was no injury caused to domestic producers, or that the degree of
injury was not significant (de minimus). When significant injury is found,
as this statement indicates, then the conclusion is to ensconce the duties.
But this was a regional case and the rules require much more than this
level of evidence. Following are the arguments related to determining what
proportion of producers were injured.
CITT also reported that there was a certain proportion of commer-
cial production that had not been “materially” injured. The rational for this
conclusion was that “some producers were able to achieve better than
average prices for their corn despite the presence of dumped and subsi-
dized imports from the United States.”  Analytically, this statement is tauto-
logical and trivial, unless CITT assumes there should have been one price
for corn over the relevant period. That proposition would be taking the
notion of the Law of One Price to the extreme. Clearly in any distribution
of market prices, some prices are above and some must be below an (arbi-
trarily determined) mean. This wording also suggests that a market organi-
zation in which producers were paid a flat price (as in a pooled price)
would help ensure a finding of injury.
“In addition, certain major corn users pay a higher-than-
average price for domestic corn because it has qualities or
characteristics that may be required in processing.”
As in any agricultural market, all product is not perfectly substitut-
able; some product may have added value for some purposes, other prod-
uct, less. But the real question is: higher than what “average price?”  Clearly
according to CITT’s own findings, the answer is “an average price that has
been reduced by the claimed subsidized and dumped imports.” Alterna-
tively, this statement demonstrates the total irrelevance of market charac-
teristics in the administrative process that is applied in assessing injury.
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“It was apparent that some producers were able to achieve
reasonable rates of return, even in the 1999/2000 crop year
when U.S. import prices were at their lowest levels.”
To an economist, this statement reads much more like a value-
loaded assessment than an evidentiary statement. In addition, simple logic
says that if subsidized and dumped imports had not depressed prices, these
particular producers would have had a higher rate of return. That conclu-
sion would be consistent with evidence of economic injury. The dichotomy
between the conclusions of CITT (and trade remedy law in general) and
the way economists analyze market results comes about largely because
injury in these cases is not determined in relation to the economic losses/
costs created by the imports. The criterion employed in these cases is an
administrative concept—“material injury”—which means reducing re-
turns below  administratively defined costs of production. This defini-
tion is extremely restrictive and its application to the broader issue of free
trade and gains from trade creates problems. It is also one of the funda-
mental complaints by economists about the application of trade remedy
law and it is particularly troublesome when applied to agricultural mar-
kets.
CITT identified another category of corn growers that was not af-
fected by subsidized and dumped imports in the same way as producers
that operate in the commercial market. . . . Diversified farmers who have
livestock operations and who also grow their own corn for feed . .  are able
to achieve “certain synergies between their animal and grain operations.”
The evidence showed that these producers have costs of production that
are much lower than the industry average.
Livestock manure is used as fertilizer, usually on all crops. Notice
how the argument has shifted to cost of production from corn prices.  Even
though the dispute is about corn prices, livestock accounts became rel-
evant to the analysis, meaning that the enterprise mix of farmers in Manitoba
is part of the assessment of impacts of U.S. crop subsidization. If the live-
stock aspects of enterprise mix is important, in economic terms, other feed
grains should be as well.327
“On-farm users are also effectively insulated from most
market price fluctuations.”
Although some of these TRL cases consider price variability con-
tributions of imports, the author saw no reference in the documents about
that being a criterion in this case. Fluctuations in prices are not levels of
prices. Moreover, this CITT argument applies only if corn has no opportu-
nity value which is certainly not the case for Manitoba corn—corn in south-
ern Manitoba very decidedly has a market price and the price is readily
available. In fact, CITT used time series data on Manitoba prices in its
analysis. The impact of dumped and subsidized corn imports on all live-
stock producers in the area was not considered. Only if CITT had recom-
mended the continuation of the duties and had initiated a third stage of the
investigation to explore the “public interest” aspects of the duties, would
the interests of all livestock feeders have been considered.
“Finally, corn grown for on-farm feed use was a significant
and increasing part of the western Canadian corn growing
industry, comprising as much as 30 percent of total pro-
duction according to some estimates.”
The implication of this statement, reinforced by feed manufactur-
ers in hearings and the U.S. Corn Producers in discussion comments on
this paper, is that injured corn producers would not increase acreage. There
are several reasons for expansion in corn acreage, not the least of which
are the removal of freight subsidies and the increasing impossibility in
Manitoba to produce economically wheat or barley for feed because of the
increase in (FHB) disease. Corn growers, like any other prairie farmers, do
not make their production decisions in isolation of other production possi-
bilities. Their production decisions are made in the face of many factors.
In this region those factors include rotational considerations, growing mar-
ketable feed, and an assessment of relative (not absolute) profitability of
corn, cereals and oilseeds. All of these options, including corn, are influ-
enced by field crop production in the United States because U.S. produc-
tion has a direct impact on Canadian prices.
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These arguments by CITT in support of their conclusions manifest
a remarkable absence of basic economic principles (opportunity cost and
value, arbitrage, relative profitability) and of market realities (array of market
prices, array of production costs). This conclusion arises as a result of the
application of administrative rules for determining material injury. The rules
are applied in absolute terms and they are administrative estimates of con-
ditions which may or may not exist. In addition, the application of regional
rules are, as indicated, firm/enterprise specific, not product specific.
This latter observation has very important implications. If, for ex-
ample, two separate regional corn cases were brought in Canada, one in a
strictly mixed farming area (say Quebec) and one in a strictly corn monoc-
ulture area (irrigated southern Alberta), the same subsidization and dump-
ing margins could produce injury (and permanent duties) in one region
(Alberta), and nothing in the other region (Quebec). This polar- extreme
finding would turn strictly on the organization of farms (enterprise mix).
Such a conclusion flies in the face of simple economics and it would be
contrary to positive, economics-based public policy. On a final point, the
rules as they were applied in this case might also have been used on the
interrelationship between corn and other feed grains as there are likely
potential and real “synergies in corn/barley/wheat production combina-
tions,” especially under the disease conditions of crop production in
Manitoba. If this relationship had been examined, it would have produced
the opposite conclusion to livestock because depressed corn prices mean
all feed grains in the area are depressed. The arbitrary inclusion of farm
fed corn makes no economic sense.
CITT’s main conclusion on injury was as follows:
“Thus, while many domestic producers who sold their
corn on the commercial market had been [materially]
injured by the subject imports, when the non-injured pro-
duction represented by on-farm use was combined with
the portion of commercial sales that had achieved rea-
sonable returns, there was little doubt that the ‘all or
almost all’ injury threshold had not been met in this case.”329
The duties were removed, effective March 7, 2001 and imported corn be-
gan to flow again.
CITT CONCLUSIONS AND SOME OBSERVATIONS
The inquiries by CCRA and CITT, the dual trade remedy agencies
in Canada, concluded that subsidized and dumped U.S. imports reduce
corn prices on the Prairies. This conclusion was not a major revelation to
market observers because U.S. subsidies are reducing all crop prices on
the Canadian Prairies. What may have been a revelation was the magni-
tude of the subsidization and dumping margins. The combined margin
was originally determined to be US$1.58/bu. in the preliminary investiga-
tion, then revised to US$1.30/bu. These are large margins, both in abso-
lute and relative terms. The trading price on corn in southern Manitoba in
late 2000 was around C$2.80/bu. or about US$1.80/bu. These duties cut
off the supply of U.S. corn for feed.
Putting aside for the moment the issue of accuracy of the margin
estimates, in economic terms,  the price effect of U.S. imports on the corn
market in the Prairies is the critical issue, given that those imports reflect a
heavily subsidized production system. Casual analysis of  adjustment in
futures and cash prices when the duties were imposed in November 2000
and their subsequent levels suggest an upward movement of $10–20/tonne
on local corn, feed wheat and barley.5 Certainly the impact extended be-
yond Manitoba. If the dumping margin had been determined by direct use
of reference prices and found to be small or zero, the subsidization impact
would still have been significant in economic terms.
____________________
5  To put these numbers in perspective, an average C$15/tonne for barley, wheat and
corn represents between 30 and 40 cents per bushel. That further represents between
$20/acre to $35/acre for producers in southern Manitoba at conservative yields, with
corn being the larger amount because of its absolute yield advantage. Most producers
in the area would be satisfied to receive a costless increase in net return, and even half
the official margins over total costs would be extremely positive in terms of farm
health.  In economic equilibrium with free trade and no U.S. subsidization, these
amounts should be larger because U.S. corn prices would be higher. Of course, this
would create the undesirable spin-off of rising land prices on the Canadian Prairies!
Loyns330 Keeping the Borders Open
Imposition of duties and cutting off imported corn threw the feed
market in the intensive livestock area of Manitoba into major confusion
and uncertainty. Hedges on corn were immediately rendered useless; for-
ward buying of feed became uncertain; feed costs rose unpredictably; and
the market area for feed was extended further westward contributing to
higher freight costs on feed grain. These outcomes are not trivial and it is
not at all surprising that there were strong opponents in the livestock and
feed sectors to the duties. In November and December 2000, holding a
long cash corn position in Manitoba was a decided asset for livestock feed-
ers, a feedlot or feed mill operator, or grain dealers. However, a long cash
corn position for members of the MCGA produced some symptoms not
unlike being declared infected with a serious communicable disease.6
Table 4 summarizes some of the impacts of these trade actions and
the distribution of  costs and benefits of the actions. The categories of costs
and benefits are defined in relation to economic considerations and in terms
of criteria deduced from objectives of free trade agreements. Without con-
ducting quantitative analysis, it appears that these actions produced a nega-
tive sum game outcome.7
In the author’s view, the Manitoba corn case has the markings of a
seminal case in the application of trade remedy actions as a solution to
agricultural trade disputes for two reasons:
• The estimate of the combined subsidization and dumping effects
was incredibly large, representing about 90 percent of the trad-
ing price in the affected area. The estimate was conducted in
accordance with usual administrative rules, and was not seriously
challenged in terms of accuracy.8 A subsidization/ dumping valu-
____________________
6  These impacts of the imposition of duties reinforce the comments made by two bankers
at the workshop indicating they are reluctant to lend to firms subject to trade actions.
7  Loyns, Young, and Carter (2001) reported the same result in the 1998 R-CALF case.
8  At a similar conference to this one in Chicago in August 2001, Carole Goodloe
criticized the administrative approach to determining dumping margins in the Manitoba
corn case. Her comments were directed at the process of determining dumping margin,
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ation of the magnitude determined is very unusual in NAFTA
agricultural cases.
• The finding of no-injury and termination of the countervailing
and dumping duties turned on ”regional” (as opposed to “na-
tional” case) rules. CITT described the rules as being very “strin-
gent” which is an accurate description. Those rules require that
“all or almost all” of grain corn producers in western Canada
were injured.
Apparently a 90 percent rule was applied. The corn growers case
missed that threshold by a small amount, according to the methods used to
calculate injured producers. This finding of no injury has a very signifi-
cant implication—it seems that an already extremely high estimated mar-
gin could have been double, triple or even more, and the same lack of
injury would be determined. In situations where a region has some pro-
duction, it is contrary to economic logic that injury is not related to the
magnitude of subsidization and dumping. In fact, a reasonable economic
hypothesis would be that injury is directly related to the level of the margin
through price and the level of market integration. These particular markets
are highly integrated because there are no trade barriers beyond the differ-
ential subsidization levels.
The injury arguments posed for the finding of less than “all or
almost all” production were wrong in several economic and market analy-
sis terms. They ignore opportunity cost/value, arbitrage, relative profit-
ability and enterprise accounting principles; they lead to the absurd impli-
cation that if all corn produced in western Canada were fed on-farm there
would be no subsidy or dumping impact, and no cause for action. Size of
subsidy or dumping margins would not alter that absurd conclusion. In
other words, the supply curve for corn in Manitoba is deemed to be per-
fectly inelastic, another absurdity.
In relation to Canadian farm and food policy, this case typifies the
inherent Canadian tendency to promote divergent and counterproductive
interest representation based on regional and commodity lines, to the point
of inhibiting policy development and collective gains associated with pro-333
moting “national interest.”9 The intervention by the livestock and live-
stock feed sector on the Prairies, particularly in Manitoba, successfully
defended the status quo of accepting subsidized imports. At the same time,
because of subsidized grain markets in the United States, the competitive
(not comparative) advantage in livestock production is moving toward the
northern tier states, away from the Canadian Prairies where reduction of a
major subsidy (freight for grain exports) had created a comparative advan-
tage. This situation demonstrates the serious dilemma for livestock pro-
ducers and the entire feed/feeding sectors in Canada in the presence of
U.S. crop subsidization. They are forced to be U.S. competitive on feed
costs in the livestock sector, but the U.S. level of subsidization has created
the situation where that objective, relative to normalized market condi-
tions, cannot be achieved. Accepting subsidized corn from the United States
reduces the risk of becoming even less competitive, at the same time in-
creasing economic costs associated with distorted markets.
Similarly the relationship between corn growers in Manitoba and
Ontario has been fractured by this action. Ontario corn producers fought
one of these battles in the 1980s and decided they did not want another
one. In the meantime, they have apparently secured public support for
corn processing plants in the province which implies motivation for a “har-
monious”  corn market in Ontario. To head off a second national trade
action, the Ontario corn growers passed a motion that they opposed such a
trade action, effectively killing the prospect of a larger, more visible, and
potentially successful national initiative. Despite the reality (and the CITT
finding) that the U.S. subsidy impact extends across Canada, corn grower
interests were revealed to be different between eastern and western Canada
vis-á-vis subsidized imports. None of the other crop interests made the
connection between this case and their market prices and ignored the corn
growers case.
____________________
9  Dr. Hartley Furtan observes in a recent book on agricultural policy in Canada that,
because of regional, commodity and distance characteristics of Canadian agriculture,
we may be unmanageable in a policy sense. (Personal communication with the author).
There are innumerable examples of interest group posturing and government indeci-
sion that support this hypothesis. The outcome of this case certainly does not reject the
hypothesis.
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Together, the Ontario corn growers and the prairie livestock and
feed sectors, provided the public (and perhaps their governments) with the
image that subsidized and dumped corn from the United States is neces-
sary to our economic existence, and that these matters are acceptably de-
termined entirely south of the border. The manner in which the federal and
provincial governments approached this action (there were no visible state-
ments, analysis or positions put forward by either level of government)
reinforces this observation.
On the matter of overall U.S./Canadian trade relations, this case
probably did not even count. U.S. producers, other interest groups, and
governments did not intervene in the process. This non-representation of
“aggrieved” parties in a trade dispute may be precedent setting and it may
imply that what occurred behind the scenes was much more important
than the   transparency of processing the action. In production terms, even
though the situation is representative of a much wider set of producers,
this action was small enough and isolated enough to be seen to be immate-
rial.10
At the government-to-government level (United States and
Canada), this case likely had a small positive contribution to U.S./Cana-
dian relations. That ironic outcome results from the fact that U.S. crop
subsidization and its effects on prairie crop economics did not get much
exposure from the case. Had the case gone to the next level of public
interest hearings and the issue of dealing with semi-permanent loss of corn
imports and livestock interests, greater attention would have focused on
these issues. The action did not, and probably could not, address the rela-
____________________
10  A reviewer of a draft of this paper observed that regional rules must be much tighter
than national rules to prevent repeated small group, harassment-type cases. While
there is some substance to that argument, harassment is certainly not just a characteris-
tic of small groups; governments may even be involved (Stiglitz 1997). The point is,
this instrument is simply not suited to the task of dealing with serious subsidization
and dumping, nor to promoting free-trade conditions. The logical starting point for
reform when a “free trade” agreement exists is within the agreement. Knutson and
Loyns present some observations on that argument in a paper on a “NAFTA Policy
Leadership Commission” (included in this set of papers).335
tionship across the feed market on the prairies of US. corn, wheat and
soybean subsidies but those relationships do exist. From the standpoint of
farm enterprises, the U.S. crop subsidies are more important in the grains
sector than they are in the livestock sector. In economic, free trade, and
policy harmonization terms, this isolated, relatively innocuous case in-
volving a virtual handful of Manitoba corn growers, taking a position
against the entire U.S. corn production system, had enormous symbolic
importance which did not come through. It pitted Manitoba corn growers
against the Canadian livestock and commercial feed sectors—U.S. subsi-
dies won.
 In the end, this case, like so many others, challenges one of the
primary dispute resolution mechanisms being used among the NAFTA
partners to settle policy and trade differences in agriculture. In an upcom-
ing book from the Center for Agricultural Policy and  Trade Studies at
North Dakota State University (2002), Jabara and Reeder of the U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission  make the point that NAFTA was never in-
tended to achieve “free trade,” rather it was intended to promote greater
trade among the three countries and to achieve deregulation in some sec-
tors. Assessed within that context, undoubtedly NAFTA has achieved con-
siderable progress. In fact, addressing that issue was the purpose of the
2000 Policy Disputes Information workshop, and the results of the work-
shop supported this conclusion (Proceedings 2001) as have several others.
Trade has increased and there has been major improvement in the terms of
trade in many areas.
THE CORN CASE, TRADE DISPUTES AND NAFTA
The purpose of this paper and other case studies in the workshop
was to examine how trade remedy laws are applied and how they contrib-
ute to resolution of trade disputes: are trade actions under domestic trade
remedy law positive or negative contributors to longer-term freer trade
and trade harmony among the NAFTA partners? The author’s conclusion
from reviewing the Manitoba case, and others presented in these work-
shops in the past, is that in economic terms, trade remedy laws do not fit
the problem and their application is not contributing to more even terms
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of trade.11 They are costly, they are divisive, and there is not much evi-
dence that they effectively resolve trade and policy differences. Non-econo-
mists can argue that conclusions like these are reflective of a profession
which is “not in the game.” Certainly economics is not the only relevant
discipline. However, free and increased trade are institutional arrangements
which are grounded in economic principles. Unless one believes that free
trade agreements are a form of formalizing a leadership-followership asso-
ciation, they are signed because the parties expect net economic benefits
from their existence. When trade agreements designed to accomplish eco-
nomic objectives are implemented, economic conduct and consequences
have to  work if the objectives are to be achieved. The purpose of freer
trade is not to provide employment to particular categories of administra-
tors and consultants, nor is it to provide a mechanism to allow groups or
nations to protect the status quo. The politicians and the officials in three
countries who negotiated NAFTA had a vision of the organization of the
North American economy for the benefit of their own nations and for the
benefit of the region. That organization is certainly grounded in econom-
ics, business and more balanced trading relations within the region.
Trade remedy law as it is being applied is not contributing to that
vision in the agricultural sector. It is not entirely clear from other papers in
this workshop that the number of trade disputes is increasing under NAFTA.
However, it is clear that there are some disputes processed under trade
remedy law that are caused by increased trade because of NAFTA, and
there is clear evidence that the application of trade remedy law is costing
some NAFTA sectors significant amounts of resources. Certainly the most
visible dispute resolution mechanism is the application of domestic trade
remedy law.
This particular case also demonstrates an important, basic and grow-
ing flaw in the NAFTA. Canada and Mexico, both significant crop and
livestock production sector partners within NAFTA have created “nearly”
____________________
11  The Stiglitz article (1997) reaches the same conclusion from a more comprehensive
review of the application of U.S. trade remedy law.337
open borders in crop and livestock commodities and their products,12 but
the resulting trade is played out on a field where the dominant partner has
been increasing subsidies to field crop producers. Those subsidies impact
all the way through crop and livestock production.13 Given the U.S. sup-
port to its producers, there are only two ways to level the playing field and
to achieve the economic efficiencies contemplated under “free trade.” The
preferred economic option is to achieve balanced subsidization by remov-
ing it where it exists—in the United States. The other option is to balance
subsidies by increasing them in Canada and Mexico, a solution bearing a
host of negative economic consequences. Except for one provincial juris-
diction in Canada, that solution is claimed to be too expensive to be con-
sidered by either country. Retaining the status quo produces consequences
and distortions like those discussed in relation to this corn action.
 This paper and many others have demonstrated that trade remedy
law contributions are at best evasive, and at worst counterproductive in
settling most agricultural disputes. Clearly they are not tools that may be
used to alter subsidy imbalances, particularly those that exist in the North
American crop sector. As a result, we have to conclude that a level playing
field within NAFTA for prairie corn growers, for most Canadian crop and
livestock producers, and for most Mexican producers in these areas is not
on the NAFTA agenda, nor is it likely to be.  NAFTA does not even deal
with these issues. Some policy analysts, including the discussant on this
paper, use this observation to indicate that NAFTA is not part of the prob-
lem. That line of logic fits neither the author’s views nor the raison d’Ltre
of the workshops. From the economic perspective and from the economic
evidence that has been generated by these workshops, major changes in
____________________
12  “Nearly” is the key word. The author of this paper is well aware of the lingering
impediments to open trade in the crop and livestock sectors, and he is a strong sup-
porter of negotiating them away. In fact, slowly, some progress is occurring. The issue
of crop subsidies in the United States has become a new issue since NAFTA was put in
place and it is an issue that dwarfs all others in terms of costs and economic signifi-
cance.
13  If there is any doubt about the validity of this statement, consider the “adjustments”
that are being made in the new U.S. Farm Bill on soybeans and the export to the United
States of Canadian weanling pigs.
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both trade and policy dispute resolution are indicated. The executive sum-
mary circulated from the 2001 Policy Disputes Information workshop closed
with the following conclusion:
Currently, there is a shortsighted tendency to protect do-
mestic industries, rather than to plan for the long-term ben-
efits to be gained from market integration.  (Executive Sum-
mary, 2001).
The MCGA case against imports from the United States demon-
strates this conclusion  yet another time, and it demonstrates that Canadian
trade remedy law does not contribute to resolving major subsidization in
neighboring markets. And it demonstrates that, for all the positive contri-
butions of NAFTA to North American trade, NAFTA is of little use in achiev-
ing balanced terms of trade in the crop sector.
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APPENDIX
The data in Table A.1 indicate that in Canada, corn and barley are about
equivalent as feed grain sources, and wheat is much smaller but still sig-
nificant. Over the 1990s, wheat has been declining in production but it has
been reasonably stable as a feed source. Corn production and imports are
increasing. Barley production and use as a feed grain have grown. Feed
barley exports from Canada have fallen significantly over this period.
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Table A.1:  Canadian Feed Grain Use 1991-92 to 2000-01 Averages.
CORN:
Production 7.3  million metric tonnes ￿
Imports 1.1 mmt ￿￿
Exports 0.4 mmt  œ since early 1990s
Human and Industrial Use 1.6 mmt ￿
Feed, Waste, Dockage* 6.4 mmt ￿
BARLEY:
Production 12.4 mmt ￿
Imports < 0.1 mmt
Exports and Domestic Human Use 5.5 mmt œ
Feed, Waste, Dockage* 6.5 mmt ￿
NON DURUM WHEAT:
Production 21.9 mmt  œ
Imports —
Exports and Domestic Human Use 18.7 mmt  œ
Feed, Waste, Dockage* 2.4 mmt  ß
Note: The ‘Feed, Waste, Dockage’ category is a derived residual.
Source: Canada Grains Council, Statistical Handbook 2001. The wheat
numbers were corrected to reflect 10-year averages.